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TORT REFORM AND THE ROLE OF

GOVERNMENT IN PRIVATE INSURANCE
MARKETS
PATRICIA M. DANZON*

PUBLIC concern over liability rules in recent years has been triggered by
disruption in liability insurance markets. The medical malpractice and
product liability "crises" of the mid-seventies were marked by insurance
premium increases of several hundred percent in a single year and complete withdrawal of commercial carriers from some areas. Although insurance is now generally available, high premium rates for some product
lines remain controversial.' A related and growing concern is the inadequacy of existing insurance and self-insurance reserves to cover product liability claims for occupational disease.
These disruptions have led to two types of statutory response. The first,
which works on the tort system directly, includes changes in underlying
liability rules, redefining damages, the standard of care, and the statute of
limitations. The second operates on insurance markets, through rate regulation and various subsidy mechanisms. This paper evaluates these two
forms of intervention, noting that the tort system may be viewed as a
system of compulsory insurance,2 with terms of coverage determined
largely by the private choices that generate court decisions. Statutory tort
reform may be viewed as a collective choice to override the private
choices reflected in the evolution of common law.

* Associate Professor, Center for Health Policy Research and Education, Duke University. This paper was written while I was Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. I
would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Ellickson, Roger Noll, Mitchell
Polinsky, Gary Schwartz, and other participants in the Stanford Law and Economics Free
Lunch program, and Daniel Rubinfeld.
' Hearings on the Nature and Causes of the Product Liability Problem Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).

2 See, for example, Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 Bell J. Econ. 3

(1973).

[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIII (August 1984)]
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I adopt the premise that the criterion for an efficient liability rule is the

minimization of costs from four sources: injuries, injury prevention, risk
bearing, and the overhead cost of litigation and administration. In the case
of medical malpractice and product-related injuries, some transfer of liability from victim to injurer seems optimal, because of information asym-

metries and contracting costs. Imposing liability on injurers promises
gains in prevention, and perhaps risk allocation, that outweigh the additional overhead costs. But it remains to define the limits of the optimal
transfer of liability on several margins. Here I ignore the fundamental
question whether the liability rule should be negligence or strict liability
and focus instead on the amount of compensation and the period in which
claims may be brought.
Any rule of third-party liability provides the potential beneficiary with

some degree of compulsory insurance and, like any insurance, thereby
invites moral hazard on several dimensions. Here I ignore the question of
reduced incentives for injury prevention by the potential victim. My concern is with incentives to file exaggerated or invalid claims. I argue that,
whether because of this moral hazard or other biases, liability on both

margins-size of awards and period for suit-has been pushed beyond
the socially optimal level, given the resulting impact on deterrence, risk
allocation, and overhead costs. Statutory limitations on damage awards
and on the period for suit (statutes of limitations or repose) would improve the overall efficiency of the tort system in ways that have been
neglected by courts ruling on the constitutionality of such legislation.3
These limits would also go a long way toward resolving the perceived
problems in liability insurance markets and are superior to the alternative
of direct government intervention.
The paper is in two parts. Part I discusses awards. Section IA describes
the theoretically optimal structure of awards for the dual purpose of com-

pensation and deterrence. The formal model in Appendix A, following
Spence,4 shows the optimality of a two-part rule of damages: (1) a compensatory award, paid to the victim, determined by the amount of insurance he would have chosen to buy given the price of the defendant's
liability insurance; and (2) a "deterrence surcharge" or fine on the defendant, paid to the state, determined by potential victims' willingness to pay
for injury prevention and by the uninsured costs of suit to the defendant.

Empirical evidence is then presented to provide rough dollar counterparts
to these theoretical constructs. The tort norm of full compensation is
3 For example, 25 A.L.R. 4th 643 (1983).
4 A. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,
44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561 (1977).
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shown to provide more insurance than people would voluntarily choose.
While this conclusion and several parts of the underlying analysis are not
new, my purpose is to pull them together and draw explicit inferences for
tort reform. Sections IE and IF analyze two specific proposals. The first
replaces the existing system of individually determined awards with a
schedule of payments, similar in principle but not necessarily in magnitude to workers' compensation benefit schedules. The second integrates
tort with other private and public sources of coverage, by providing for
subrogation rights of all private coverages against the tort award and
reduction of public benefits by the amount of tort recovery.
Part II analyzes the impact of long statutes of repose for latent injuries
and long-lived products, when liability rules are changing and uncertain.5
Anticipated changes may either force an intergenerational transfer or ex-

pose producers or victims to risk. Uncertain changes create sociolegal
risk that is independent of the size of the risk pool and cannot be costlessly diversified through multiline insurance portfolios or stock markets.
A model of the relationship between the statute of limitations, the insur-

ance risk, and the price of insurance is developed (Appendix B). The
concluding subsection argues for a shorter statute of repose, shifting compensation for long latent injuries to first-party mechanisms, in preference
to special government funds.
I. SIZE OF AWARDS

Awards for catastrophic injuries account for a very large fraction of the

cost of the tort system. Three percent of all medical malpractice claims
(or 5 percent of paid claims) account for 50 percent of the total dollars
paid out. Since the early seventies, tort awards, especially for severe
injuries, have grown more rapidly than the rate of inflation.6 In response

5 Several different definitions of "statute of repose" are in use. See Francis E.

McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579 (1981). I use "statute of repose" to refer to a statute that places

a limit on the time in which actions may be brought under traditional statutes of limitations.
This may be done either by setting an outer limit on a "discovery" provision or by setting
the time at which the statute begins to run at a different point from traditional tort statutes of

limitation, which begin to run only when the cause of action, including the manifestation of
the injury, has accrued.

6 For the period 1971-78 the Insurance Services Office estimates annual growth rates in
average incurred cost per claim as follows: physicians and surgeons, 12.1 percent; hospitals,
18.9 percent; product liability bodily injury, 19.4 percent; automobile bodily injury, 14.1
percent. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims,

27 J. Law & Econ. 115 (1984). See also Mark A. Peterson & George L. Priest, The Civil

Jury: Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979 (R-2881-ICJ, Rand
Corp. 1982).
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to the liability crisis of the mid-seventies, many states enacted tort "re-

forms" designed to reduce awards. Of these changes, dollar caps and
mandatory offset of compensation from collateral sources appear to have
had a significant impact,' but in several states they have not survived
constitutional challenge.

A. The Optimal Structure of Tort Awards
Under current rules, tort damage awards may have both a compensatory and a punitive component. Compensatory awards are intended to
compensate fully for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. In addition to
compensatory damages, punitive damages may be awarded in cases of
reckless disregard.
Cook and Graham and Spence have shown that the principle of full
compensation is unlikely to be optimal from the standpoint of either deter-

rence or compensation, at least in the case of seriously disabling injuries.8

In Appendix A, I develop a model of the optimal structure of awards
when the potential injurer (producer) and victim (consumer) are in a market relationship and the probability of injury depends only on the prevention effort of the producer.9 The model extends that of Spence, by allowing for uninsured costs of suit to the injurer, and by recognizing the
expense loading in liability insurance premiums. The effect of consumer

misperception of risk is analyzed, since this provides the primary

rationale for restrictions on private contracts and mandatory third-party
liability in these markets.
The main implications of this model are that the optimal award depends
on the type of injury, the expense load of the defendant's liability insurance, and the extent to which contractual relations between the parties
transmit ex ante consumers' true willingness to pay for safety. There are

two issues: compensation and deterrence. Optimal compensation depends only on the type of loss and the expense loading. The optimal
compensatory award is the amount of insurance the victim would have
purchased voluntarily, at the price implied by the load of the defendant's
liability insurance.'l This is intuitively obvious, since the tort system
provides compulsory insurance, purchased from the defendant or ultimately from his liability insurer. The tort norm of full compensation is
7 Danzon, supra note 6.
8 Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The
Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. Econ. 143 (1977). Spence, supra note 4.
9 The model can readily be extended to include victim precautions. See Samuel A. Rea,
Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982).
1o This analysis ignores social benefits from private enforcement of laws.
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optimal only if the loss is purely monetary and the load is zero. But for a
serious injury that affects the utility of wealth, optimal compensation

could be more or less than the monetary loss, depending on whether
disability raises or lowers the marginal utility of wealth, which cannot be
determined a priori." Full compensation for pain and suffering is unlikely

to be optimal, because insurance can only transfer money from the
healthy to the disabled state, but money cannot replace the nonpecuniary
losses of physical injury. Optimal insurance transfers dollars only to the
point where the victim values the marginal dollar as much when disabled
as when he is healthy. With a positive load, optimal coverage is lower.
If optimal compensation is less than full, so the victim is not indifferent

to the occurrence of injury, the compensatory award alone may provide
insufficient incentives for prevention. If consumers are in a market relation with producers, and correctly perceive the risk of injury ex ante and
can costlessly monitor contract performance ex post, consumer willingness to pay for injury prevention is internalized to producers through
markets. In that case, the compensatory award also suffices for optimal
deterrence.

But if consumers misperceive risk or cannot observe whether the quality of service delivered is that contracted for-or if contracting costs are
high-consumer willingness to pay for risk reduction is not internalized to
the injurer. The tort system may correct this potential market failure by
levying a fine over and above the compensatory award. At the extreme,
with no internalization through markets and a risk-neutral or fully insured

(but perfectly experience rated) defendant, the optimal fine is the value of
the injury implied by the victim's willingness to pay for prevention given
optimal insurance. The optimal fine is less if (a) markets transmit somewhat, albeit imperfectly, the value consumers place on prevention, or (b)
the defendant incurs uninsurable costs of suit, such as loss of time or
reputation.12 In principle, the fine should be paid to the state and refunded

as a subsidy to consumers of the risky product. If the fine is paid as
compensation to individual victims, it provides more insurance than consumers would buy voluntarily, and hence product prices, which will include the cost of this insurance, would be too high. This distortion of
relative prices is avoided if the fine is refunded as a subsidy.

" See also Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contingent Damages for Products

Liability, in this issue.

12 The fine necessary to induce compliance with a negligence standard is less than the
optimal fine under strict liability, assuming the due care standard is known and enforced
without error, because the defendant's cost function is discontinuous under a negligence
rule. See note 71 infra.
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Although the current system of compensatory plus punitive damage
awards is structurally similar to this ideal two-part system, it is defective
in that (1) compensatory awards aim at full compensation for pecuniary
plus nonpecuniary loss, regardless of consumers' willingness to pay for
such insurance, and (2) punitive awards are judged by defendants' conduct rather than consumers' willingness to pay for prevention, and are
paid as compensation to victims rather than refunded to consumers. The
full compensation principle implies excessive deterrence and excessive
insurance.13
The implementation of this theoretically optimal structure of awards
requires information on willingness to pay for insurance and prevention
that cannot be determined a priori. For this we must turn to empirical
evidence.

B. Evidence on the Demand for Disability Insurance
Theory cannot tell us whether disability lowers or raises the utility of
wealth, so cannot tell us whether optimal compensation is less or greater
than monetary loss. On this question there are two sources of empirical
evidence. Compulsory public coverages-Social Security Disability In-

come (SSDI), workers' compensation, Medicare and Medicaid-indicate
collective choices, given implicit prices which reflect moral hazard and
the redistributive features of the funding system. Because participation is
compulsory, adverse selection is not an issue. Private first-party coverage
indicates what people are prepared to pay for, given the mandatory public
programs and tort, at prices that reflect risks of adverse selection and
moral hazard in private insurance markets.

1. Wage Loss. Under SSDI, the primary public disability program,
income replacement varies with the age, work experience, family size,
and predisability earnings of the recipient. Replacement rates for persons
eligible for family benefits range from less than 40 percent for those with

predisability earnings greater than the taxable maximum ($1,475 per
month in 1978) to 86 percent for those earning the minimum wage ($442
per month in 1978). For individuals, comparable replacement levels range

3 Compensation for pain and suffering, if correctly calculated as willingness to pay for
prevention, would provide optimal deterrence but excessive compensation. Willingness to
pay as a measure of compensation for pain and suffering is discussed in Bryan C. Conley &
G. M. Flick, Toward an Objective Valuation of Pain and Suffering (January 1978) (unpublished manuscript, Grad. School Business Administration, Univ. Southern California). They
do not distinguish between the optimum award for purposes of compensation and deterrence.
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from less than 30 percent to 55 percent. Since these ratios are calculated
relative to pretax earnings, replacement of after-tax income is higher.14
In 1980, only 21 million people, or 10 percent of the population under
sixty-four (19.7 percent of the labor force) had private long-term disability

(LTD) income protection. However, 45 percent of civilian workers have
private pension coverage which often pays in the event of early disability.
Coverage under private LTD and pension plans is less than full income
replacement. All private LTD plans limit replacement levels to 60-70
percent of predisability salary and include offset provisions against other
coverages, in particular SSDI, to prevent benefits exceeding this limit.15
For example, for steel workers, whose fringe benefits are more generous
than average, replacement income without SSDI benefits averages 0-48
percent of predisability wages, 55-70 percent with SSDI benefits.16 The
apparent gaps in private wage-loss coverage, despite the tax advantages
of employment-based plans,17 appear to reflect the fact that for the major-

ity of workers, SSDI benefits already provide the maximum permitted by
private insurers, namely 60-70 percent of predisability, pretax earnings,

with offset of SSDI benefits.'8

2. Medical Expense. Private insurance markets indicate a lack of willingness to pay for unlimited medical care. Forty-eight percent of the
population under sixty-five has no private major medical expense protection and private coverage of nursing home or noninstitutional long-term
care is negligible. 19 Only 36 percent of major medical plans have unlimited

maximum benefits.20 The prevalence of major medical policies overstates

private coverage of long-term medical expense because 76 percent is

14 Charles W. Meyer, Social Security Disability Insurance (1979).

5 Health Insurance Association of America, New Group Health Insurance Policies

(1983).

16 Lawrence S. Roof, Fringe Benefits: Social Insurance in the Steel Industry 115 (1982).
17 Insurance premiums and employer contributions to pension funds are a business expense, and interest on such funds is substantially exempt from tax.
18 Since eligibility for SSDI benefits is not conditioned on other nonearned income, the
tendency for a means-tested public insurance program to undermine the demand for private

insurance does not apply. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Private Disability Insurance and Public
Welfare Programs, 36 J. Pub. Finance 84 (1981). But a related effect may operate. Private
coverage for catastrophic health expense and long-term care is limited (see infra). To be
eligible for public support for such expenses, the individual must "spend down" to the
Medicaid income threshold. Thus the optimum private strategy for long-term institutional
care may be to rely on Medicaid, in which case private wage-loss insurance has little value.
19 Fewer than 4 percent of nursing home expenditures are covered by private insurance.
Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Care for the Elderly and Disabled (1977).
20 Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance, 1981-82

(1983).
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employment based, so is lost if the disabled person loses his job.21 But as
in the case of wage loss, apparent gaps in private medical coverage may
reflect a rational adjustment to public programs. After two years the SSDI
recipient is eligible for Medicare, which covers acute care. Long-term
institutional care is covered by Medicaid, which pays for over one-third of
all long-term-care recipients.
3. Lump-Sum Payments. The only private disability insurance which

is not a replacement of specific expenses and thus bears some resemblance to compensation for pain and suffering is accidental death and
dismembership (ADD) insurance, carried by 57 percent of civilian wage
earners.22 These policies typically pay a prespecified sum in the event of a
readily identifiable physical injury, such as loss of a limb. But the fact that

total ADD contributions by employers and employees are less than 1
percent of total contributions to health benefits is indicative of a relatively

low willingness to pay for compensation beyond income replacement and
medical expense.

C. Implications for Compensatory Tort Awards
This evidence from private and collective choices suggests that the tort
norm of full coverage of all pecuniary loss plus pain and suffering far
exceeds the coverage people are prepared to pay for given the choice.
However, private choices may not be adequate evidence, to the extent
that they are constrained by consumer misperceptions, moral hazard,
adverse selection, and loading charges. If courts have superior access to

information, lower costs of controlling adverse selection and moral
hazard, or lower loading charges, optimal compensatory tort awards
would exceed the revealed choices in private markets. Let us take each of
these in turn.

It is often argued that people tend to underestimate very low probability

events, which would imply suboptimal insurance purchases. But to purchase appropriate first-party disability insurance, the individual does not
need to know his risk from each possible source but only his overall
probability of disability, which may be estimated from readily available
21 Because insurance costs of disability act as an impediment to rehiring, all states have
second injury funds for workers compensation, but many are very restricted in the scope of

prior injuries covered. See Lloyd W. Larson & John F. Burton, Jr., Special Funds in
Workers' Compensation (1981) (unpublished manuscript, Cornell Univ., School of Indus-

trial and Labor Relations).

22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 333 (1981).
ADD does not cover disability due to illness, perhaps because illness entails more severe
adverse selection and greater moral hazard of fraudulent claims than more readily identified
injuries.
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data. This overall probability of disability is not negligibly low. In 1978,
10.9 million or 8.6 percent of the noninstitutionalized civilian population
aged eighteen to sixty-four were severely disabled (unable to work altogether or unable to work regularly). A further 11.0 million (8.7 percent)
reported partial disability (a health condition that restricts the kind or
amount of work).23 Information costs are further reduced by employment-

based group programs, which also reduce adverse selection.24 The fact
that employee benefit programs are carefully coordinated with public programs suggests that the apparent gaps in private coverage are due less to
ignorance and adverse selection than to a desire by employees and insurers to constrain the moral hazard that would result from higher benefit
levels. Moral hazard-which may take the form of reduced effort to prevent injury, exaggerated or fraudulent claims, or increased consumption
of health services-obviously limits the coverage private markets can
provide efficiently. Thus private contracts limit income replacement to
60-70 percent of predisability earnings, reduce benefits by payments received from public programs to prevent more than full income replacement, impose upper limits on medical coverage, and exclude some services totally.
The tort system seems to have no advantages over private insurance
that would justify higher levels of compensation. Juries obviously have
inferior information about individual preferences ex ante. As tort coverage is compulsory, it is not subject to adverse selection, but neither are
large private employment-based group plans.25 With respect to moral
hazard, the tort system is more exposed than most private coverages. The

potential for moral hazard arises because the claimant gains the full
benefit of any award, net of his legal fees, whereas the cost is spread
among all potential beneficiaries-consumers, in the case of product lia-

bility, patients in the case of medical malpractice. To control moral
23 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 336 (1982-83),
derived from U.S. Social Security Administration, 1978 Survey of Disability and Work:
Databook (1982). A further 1.8 million persons under sixty-five (.9 percent of the under-

sixty-five population) were in nursing homes. A 1974 survey showed 12 percent of severely
disabled adults received veterans' benefits, so may have been disabled in military service.

U.S. Department of Labor, An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease 61

(1980).

24 For the effect of adverse selection on private insurance markets see Michael Rothschild
& Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. Econ. 629 (1976). The differential between the price of

individual and group health coverage suggests severe adverse selection in the individual

market.

25 This feature of tort might be undermined if contracting out of tort rights were permitted, as suggested in Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract,
1976. Am. B. Found. Research J. 87.
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hazard, private insurance contracts typically include a coinsurance percentage that is higher the more the policyholder can do to affect the loss.
Analogous protections in tort law are the contributory negligence defense
(total bar to recovery) and the comparative negligence reduction in the
award in proportion to the plaintiffs fault. But contributory negligence
has been eliminated in many states in product liability cases, and comparative negligence is of limited scope. Although legal fees constitute a
sizable copayment for the plaintiff, their effect is muted by the contingent

fee, which is paid only in the event of a positive recovery. In the absence
of statutory limits on awards, there is no constraint comparable to the
upper limit on coverage found in most private insurance contracts. The
private insurance principle of less than full compensation to deter moral
hazard is undermined by the collateral source rule, which denies evidence
of coverage from other sources, and by disallowing evidence of the taxfree status of tort awards. Finally, with respect to administrative expense,
the load on liability insurance policies, which is relevant to determining
optimal tort awards, is higher than on first-party insurance.
In conclusion, the tort system has no obvious advantage in terms of
information, adverse selection, moral hazard, or administrative cost that
would justify setting compensatory awards above the levels of insurance
coverage chosen in employment-based group programs.

D. Deterrent Surcharge
The optimal value of the deterrent surcharge, over and above the compensatory award, depends on consumer willingness to pay for injury prevention, given optimal compensation, and on the degree to which this is
internalized to injurers either through markets or through uninsured costs
of suit.

The best evidence for willingness to pay for injury prevention is labor
market data on wage differentials in risky industries, because labor markets reveal insurance and prevention trade-offs made subject to a large
measure of cost internalization. Workers' compensation benefits reflect a
legislated collective insurance choice in which employers and unions have
significant input. Industry-specific collective bargaining provides a mechanism for trading off wage levels, other benefits, and possibly safety
measures. Thus, with the exception of SSDI and other public sources of
compensation, labor markets reveal choices of injury prevention and insurance when costs are internalized, insurance premiums are widely experience rated,26 and potential victims, through unions, are reasonably
well informed about injury risks.
26 Richard B. Victor, Workers' Compensation and Workplace Safety: the Nature of Employer Financial Incentives (Rand Corp. no. R-2979-ICJ, 1982).
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Wage differentials in risky occupations imply a value of life ranging
from $500,000 to over $4 million, and a value of $20-$30,000 for nonfatal
injuries and illnesses (1980 prices).27 These labor market estimates obviously cannot be immediately extrapolated to the willingness of potential
tort claimants to pay for product or medical injury prevention. First, the
theory indicates and the evidence confirms that willingness to pay de-

pends on such factors as age, income, quality of life and risk in the
absence of injury, voluntary versus involuntary assumption of risk, and
the type of nonfatal injury or illness. Second, private choices are constrained by private budgets. Most public insurance programs incorporate
some income redistribution, and it is a normative issue whether the tort
system should assess penalties and hence encourage differential prevention, by income level. Third, labor market choices do not internalize all
social costs because the public programs, which pay a large share of the

costs of disability, are not experience rated. Using a more complete
theoretical model to incorporate all social costs, Arthur obtains estimates
of the value of saving a life in different contexts that are under $1.4 million

(1980 dollars) for all but the youngest age groups.28
Even if consumer valuations of tort injuries could be accurately measured, several factors argue against implementing them directly as fines.
If the fine is insurable and does not affect the individual firm's premium,29
then the fine serves no deterrent purpose. If paid to the victim, it provides

excessive insurance. If refunded as a subsidy to consumers, the subsidy
simply cancels the increment in price due to the cost of insurance, minus
administrative costs. If the fine is not insurable, a fine of the magnitude
implied by value of life estimates is likely to bankrupt most individual
defendants. But as the prospective uninsured loss to the defendant increases, the need for a deterrent surcharge declines, since the optimal fine
falls short of the victim's willingness to pay by the amount of any uninsured cost to the defendant.
E. Individual versus Scheduled Awards

The tort system differs from the other major compulsory insurance
systems-Social Security Disability (SSDI) and workers' compensa27 W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace (1983).
The $4 million is estimated at a risk of 6 x 10-4 (6/100,000) per year, and the mean annual
risk of nonfatal injury was one in thirty. To see how wage premiums for risk are translated
into implicit values for injury, consider the following example. If a worker receives $500 annually in return for a one-in-thirty chance of injury, dividing $500 by '/3o yields an implicit value
of $15,000 for an injury. This does not mean the worker would accept certain injury for $15,000.

28 W. B. Arthur, The Economics of Risks to Life, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 54 (1981). To adjust
Arthur's calculations in 1975 dollars to 1980 dollars, I have multiplied by 1.4, the increase in
the GNP price deflator.
29 See note 36 infra.
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tion-in determining compensation for each plaintiff individually and after the occurrence of an injury. The only strategy available to defendants
(or their insurers) to contain the resulting moral hazard on the part of
claimants is legal defense effort. For medical malpractice and product
liability, litigation expense by both parties equals the net compensation to
plaintiffs.30 Overall, the defense and plaintiff contribute equally to this
total, but the plaintiff spends more, relative to the defense, the larger the

stakes.31

If tort damage rules set optimal guidelines, but both sides invest in legal
effort to maximize their private gain subject to these constraints, will the
outcome be socially optimal?32 Ignoring any precedent and enforcement
value of the case, the private benefit to the plaintiff of a higher award is
the full social benefit, while the private cost to the defense reflects the
social cost ultimately passed on to consumers, through liability insurance
premiums and product prices. Thus the outcome should, on average,
correspond to the social optimum, provided both parties face similar costs
and payoffs to legal effort. We may assume both face a common price of
legal effort. The evidence of a declining ratio of defense to plaintiff expen-

diture then suggests that returns to legal effort decline more rapidly for
the defense than for the plaintiff, the more severe the injury. This may
reflect a propensity of juries to weigh benefits more heavily than costs
when the beneficiaries are identified individuals but the costs are spread,
consistent with the familiar tendency to value lives of known individuals
more highly than unidentified statistical lives.
This propensity is apparently exacerbated when the defendant is a cor-

poration or an insurance company. For medical malpractice claims, I

found an elasticity of awards with respect to the limits of the defendant's
insurance coverage of .5-.9 for verdicts, .14 for out-of-court settlements.33 Peterson finds awards for similar injuries are higher for medical

3o To the extent litigation expense provides information that contributes to the accurate
enforcement of tort rules, it should not be viewed entirely as a deadweight cost of moral

hazard.

31 For malpractice claims closed 1975-78, the 64 percent of claims closed for less than

$3,000 involved defense expenditure in excess of indemnity paid to plaintiffs. For cases paid

over $100,000, defense expense averages less than 10 percent of indemnity. The limited
evidence on plaintiff contingent fees shows no comparable decrease with size of stakes and
an increase in fee percentage with stage of disposition.
32 This is a special case of the issue whether common-law rules are efficient. See Paul H.
Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1982), and citations therein.

3 With an elasticity of .5, a $1,000 increase in insurance limits results in a $500 increase in
award, holding constant other facts of the case. The estimate for court awards is based on a
sample of only thirty-eight claims closed in 1970. The .9 estimate has a t-statistic of 3.19; the
.55 estimate, which has a t-statistic of 1.88, includes defense expenditure as an explanatory
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malpractice, product liability, and workplace injuries than for automobile
injuries, where the defendant is typically an individual and carries lower
limits of insurance coverage than most medical or product defendants.34
The hypothesis that the judicial process tends to sanction moral hazard on
the part of severely injured plaintiffs implies that awards for severe injuries will exceed the socially optimal level, consistent with the theoretical and empirical analysis in the previous section.35
Even if individualizing awards did not distort optimal compensation on
average, it introduces variance that serves no useful purpose. Deterrence
almost by definition depends on the expected penalty, so involves some
element of averaging. If the mean were optimally set, variance would
result in overdeterrence of risk-averse defendants. In practice, experience rating of liability insurance premiums typically weights claim frequency more than severity, thereby muting the impact of variance in
awards.36 From the standpoint of compensation, uncertainty reduces the
value of an award as insurance to the plaintiff. Equivalently, the mean of a
distribution of potential awards provides less utility than would a certain
award equal to that mean.
While individualized awards add little to the deterrence and compensation value of the tort system, they do add to the litigation and insurance
overhead costs. Like any unappropriated property right, the range of the
potential award defines the maximum each party would spend on legal
variable. The .14 estimate is based on a sample of 553 claims settled out of court. All three
estimates control for number of defendants, severity of injury, age, and income of the
plaintiff. Patricia Munch Danzon, The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims (R-2622
HCFA, Rand Corp. 1980). Although the insurer can in principle contain this risk by the
limits of coverage, some courts have overruled such contractual limits if the insurer declined
a pretrial settlement offer.

34 Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Jury Verdicts in Cook County (Rand
Corp. 1983).
35 The conventional wisdom is that the tort system tends to overcompensate minor injuries and undercompensate severe injuries relative to economic loss. For out-of-court
settlements, however, the conventional wisdom is consistent with a rising ratio of plaintiffto-defense expense, since settlements tend to be lower (higher) the larger the litigation costs
of the plaintiff (defense).

36 This reflects in part the belief of liability insurers that the size of award, at some
threshold, is beyond the control of the defendant, in part the purely statistical fact that since
large awards are relatively infrequent, they have little statistical credibility. Reflecting this,

both medical malpractice and product liability use a finer rating system for basic losses
(claims below some threshold, $25,000 in 1980) than for excess losses. For example, basic
Insurance Services Office (ISO) rates for medical malpractice reflect eight medical speciality
classes and over fifty territories, but only two excess limits factors. To the extent merit
rating of medical malpractice policies exists, it is independent of size of award. Patricia M.
Danzon, Liability Insurance and the Tort System: The Case of Medical Malpractice (Working Paper No. E-83-14, Hoover Inst. 1983). Small losses also receive more weight in workers' compensation experience rating. Victor, supra note 26.
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effort to influence the outcome. Further, individualization adds to the
variance and positive skewness of the distribution of awards and hence to
the variance of insurance losses. In principle, this source of risk can be
eliminated by pooling. In practice the number of policyholders in many
states is too small to eliminate such risk.37

F. The Collateral Source Rule

The collateral source rule prohibits evidence to the jury of the plaintiff s

compensation from other private and public programs. Elimination of the
collateral source rule, to permit reduction of tort awards by the amount of

collateral benefits, has been enacted in several states for medical malpractice cases and proposed for product liability.
The main argument in favor of collateral source offset is to prevent
double compensation: "The idea of a windfall runs counter to the basic
end of tort law, which is to make the plaintiff whole, not to overcompensate him. . . . the aim should be to assure the plaintiff fair compensation
from available sources, but no more."38
But Posner has defended the traditional no-offset rule as necessary for
optimal deterrence.39 Further, he argues that any double recovery is no
windfall to the plaintiff since he paid for his first-party coverage and
could, presumably, have opted for a cheaper policy that excluded coverage of tort claims or assigned subrogation rights in such claims to his first-

party insurer. One may add, at least in contexts where the victim and
defendant are in a buyer/seller or employee/employer relation, that the
victim has also indirectly paid for the compulsory insurance provided
through the tort system, so is entitled to what he paid for.
In a world with perfect information and costless contracting, the Coase
theorem implies that the collateral source rule is neither necessary nor
sufficient for optimal deterrence or optimal insurance. Consider the case
of an injury that entails a purely monetary loss, fully covered by firstparty insurance, and for which the tort rule of full compensation provides

optimal insurance and deterrence. If the traditional collateral source rule
of no offset applies, the tort award provides optimal deterrence, and a
subrogation action by the first-party insurer against the insured (the plain-

37 For example, year-to-year changes in the mean medical malpractice award exceed 100
percent for half the states in the 1975-78 period and range from -90 percent to + 1,000
percent. Thirty-five states had fewer than one hundred paid claims per year. Danzon, supra

note 6.

38 American Bar Association, Report to the Commission on Medical Professional Liability 147 (1977).
39 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977).
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tiff in the tort suit) can eliminate double compensation.40 On the other
hand, if the tort rule is full reduction of the award by the amount of
collateral compensation, optimal compensation is achieved through the
first-party insurance, and a subrogation action by the first-party insurer
against the tortfeasor provides optimal deterrence. Thus, in either case,
two actions are necessary but together are sufficient for optimal insurance
and prevention. Alternatively, the subrogated insurer may simply receive
part of the proceeds from any judgment or settlement.
In practice, under the traditional rule of no offset, subrogation mitigates

but does not fully eliminate double recovery because contracting out is
not costless. The law recognizes subrogation rights of medical insurers
against tortfeasors or their liability insurers,41 and the prevalence of subrogation clauses in medical policies indicates public preference to eliminate double coverage. But life and accident insurance has generally been
denied subrogation rights, on the grounds that it provides "personal"
insurance rather than "indemnity" insurance; that is, life and accident

policies allegedly do not compensate for explicit economic losses. As
Kimball and Davis point out, there are significant indemnity aspects in all
forms of life and disability insurance. They conclude: "[W]here there is
an insurance against a loss measurable in economic terms, the insurer
should be legally subrogated quite as readily as in fire or collision insurance, once there has been full indemnification of the insured. Denial of
legal subrogation should reflect the lack of adequate indemnification to
the insured in the individual case, and nothing more.42
But to allow subrogation only after full indemnification of the insured
simply invites litigation over ill-defined rights, since indemnification for
personal injury can never be complete. Unrestricted freedom to contract
for subrogation in life and accident policies should be allowed, both to
discourage the moral hazard created by double coverage and to permit
individuals to choose their preferred level of compensation.
Subrogation rights found in public programs are mixed. The Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act grants the federal government a right to

40 Optimal compensation might be achieved without the supplementary subrogation action if the first-party insurance simply excluded coverage of any injury with recovery against

a third party. But such contracts tend to provide inferior insurance because of the uncertainty of tort recoveries and are less common than contracts providing subrogation rights.

41 Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
Mich. L. Rev. 841 (1962). Most first-party automobile medical coverages (which pay the
policyholder's medical costs as an endorsement to his liability insurance policy) provide for
subrogation against third parties.
42 Id. at 859-60.
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recover from a tortfeasor for medical expenses it incurs.43 Workers' compensation employers or their insurers have been explicitly accorded subrogation rights by statute in most states. However, SSDI does not have
subrogation rights.
Although the collateral source rule is irrelevant when subrogation is
permitted and contracting costs are zero, the optimal rule in practice
depends on the costs of contracting out of double compensation and of
enforcing subrogation. One obvious guiding principle is that mandatory
coverage should pay in full and be denied subrogation, whereas voluntary
first-party coverages should be free to include enforceable subrogation
clauses, thereby enabling individuals to contract out of double coverage
or supplement the mandatory coverage if they desire. This principle argues for retaining the traditional collateral source rule, since tort awards
are a form of compulsory insurance, but granting all first party coverages
subrogation rights.
This rule allowing subrogation to voluntary coverages provides no guidance for coordinating tort with other mandatory coverages, in particular,
SSDI. If tort awards were paid in periodic installments rather than a lump
sum, then any future SSDI benefits could be reduced by the amount of the
tort compensation for earnings loss, eliminating excess compensation
while preserving deterrence.44 Providing for SSDI offset when tort awards
are paid in a lump sum is less easy. Granting SSDI subrogation against the
plaintiff at a later date may be unenforceable. If the SSDI offset must be
made at the time of the tort judgment, the simplest solution is to reduce
the tort award by the amount of the expected SSDI benefits, but this
undermines deterrence. The alternative of granting SSDI subrogation
rights against the tortfeasor yields superior deterrence and equivalent
compensation, but with higher litigation expense. Such expense may be
significant in the great majority of cases that settle out of court, typically

for somewhat less than the potential verdict. The subrogation action must
then determine whether the subrogated insurer should be entitled to full
recovery or only to the proportion represented by the settlement relative
to the potential verdict.45 Coordination of legal effort by the plaintiff and
43 Rex Capwell & Thomas E. Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems Arising from
Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 255, 281 (1971).
4 Social Security Disability Income has similar offset provisions against state workers'
compensation programs. Periodic payment of an amount fixed at the time of the judgment
avoids the moral hazard of periodic payment of contingent expense discussed in Samuel A.
Rea, Jr., Lump-Sum versus Periodic Damage Awards, 10 J. Legal Stud. 131 (1981). Optimal
insurance would provide for disability payments for the duration of the victim's life, with
some lesser payment to survivors in the event of early death, as in the California Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act, Code Civ. Proc., ? 667.7.
45 The majority of courts use a prorata division, but some assign full compensation to the
insured and some full compensation to the insurer. Robert E. Keaton, Insurance Law (1971).
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subrogated insurer may also add costs. Thus efficient coordination of
SSDI and tort benefits is an additional reason for periodic payment of tort
awards.

G. Conclusion

This analysis indicates that the optimal structure of tort awards would
be a schedule providing46
compensation for medical expense such as that found in group major
medical policies;
compensation for wage loss up to 70 percent of predisability, pretax
earnings (full replacement of after-tax earnings);
no offset of private insurance coverage but unrestricted subrogation
rights of private insurers against tortfeasors and their insurers;
reduction of SSDI benefits by the amount of tort recovery for wage
loss;
a schedule of compensation for pain and suffering for serious injuries
only; and,
consistent with the principle of eliminating uncertainty, statutory stan-

dards for determining inflation, interest rates, and wage growth parameters.

In addition, an uninsurable fine may be appropriate in cases of severe
injury, when (1) consumer underestimate of risk, fraud, or breach of
explicit or implicit contract are at issue, or (2) defendants are fully insured. Where consumers are 9dequately informed or the defendant has

incurred significant loss of time or reputation in defending the suit, deter-

rence incentives may be adequate without a fine. The fine should be paid
to the state and used to defray the public costs of the judicial system,
thereby internalizing some of these costs to activities that cause injuries.
Although this reduces the plaintiffs incentives to litigate, the effect may
be negligible since a fine only applies in cases of severe injury where the
compensatory award is large.

Note that, to the extent the purpose of punitive damage awards is
deterrence, this analysis of the optimal deterrent surcharge or fine applies
directly: the optimal punitive award is simply the optimal fine.47

6 This is not intended to preclude individual contracting for amounts different from the

basic schedule, as advocated in Epstein, supra note 25.

47 Obviously, if compensatory awards continue to compensate for pain and suffering, no
fine is necessary. For an analysis of punitive damage awards, see Symposium on Punitive
Damage Awards, Discussion, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155 (1982).
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II. DURATION OF LIABILITY

A. Risk Associated with Latent Injuries
A common distinguishing feature of medical malpractice and product
liability is the long duration of potential liability because of latent injuries
and long-lived products. Regardless of the assignment of liability, delay
between the triggering event and the manifestation of injury creates uncertainty in preventing and compensating for injuries. First, delay creates
technological uncertainty in establishing the connection between the triggering event and the injury. Carcinogenic chemicals and drugs with long

latent side effects are obvious examples. Second, delay introduces a
financial risk in prefunding future compensation.48
Tort law has increasingly extended liability to protect victims of latent
injuries. For medical malpractice, many courts have adopted liberal discovery rules, which toll the running of the statute of limitations until the
injury has been, or with reasonable diligence should have been, discovered. For product liability actions in tort, the statute does not begin to run
until the occurrence or manifestation of the injury, which may be many
years after the manufacture and initial sale of the product or exposure to
the toxic substance. Since 1975, thirty-eight states have shortened their
medical malpractice statutes of limitations or set an outer limit on the
period allowed for discovery, but often with exceptions for minors and
latent injuries. McGovern identifies ninety-eight statutes in forty-eight
states that can be considered product liability statutes of repose.49
In general, court rulings on the constitutionality of such statutes50 have
not appreciated their effects on the efficiency of the tort system, some of
which are addressed here. I ignore the fact that delay leads to decay of

evidence, blurs the chain of causation, adds multiple defendants, and
hence increases litigation expense. I focus instead on the effects of changing and uncertain liability rules on deterrence, risk allocation, and regulatory costs.

First let us assume that standards are changing but known with certainty. For example, there may be an upward trend in compensable damages over time or a technological advance that reduces the cost of preventing injuries. The effect of such changes is that the optimal level of
care becomes ambiguous. Prevention costs occur at time 1 but damages
48 The financial risk arises because of uncertain timing, rather than delay per se. A certain
time schedule of future payments can be matched with the maturity schedule of financial
assets, thereby eliminating financial risk.

49 McGovern, supra note 5.
50 Note 3 supra.
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occur at time 2. Under a negligence rule, an action that is not negligent by
the standards of time 1 is negligent if costs or damages are valued at time
2. Similarly, under a strict liability rule the optimal level of care becomes
ambiguous.
If future liability for latent injuries is fully internalized into the prevention and insurance decisions at time 1, consumers at time 1 pay for the
higher safety and insurance standards of consumers at time 2. Provided
the same individuals are involved throughout, this is no cause for concern. But with long latent injuries there are overlapping generations. The
consumers who purchase the product or incur the exposure at time I are
not the same as those who set liability rules at time 2, although obviously
there is some overlap. Then with full internalization, long statutes force a
transfer from the early to later generation.
Alternatively, producers may choose not to prefund latent liability at
time 1 but rather to face liability costs when they occur at time 2. But in a
competitive industry with free entry these costs cannot be passed on to
consumers at time 2. Established firms that try to pass on current costs
arising out of past liability will be undercut by new entrants. So the cost of
latent injuries will fall initially on producers and then on victims, in the
event producers go bankrupt.
The intergenerational transfer is a more serious issue when the injury
itself is latent than it is in the case of a long-lived machine that may cause

injuries over an extended period, but where the injury itself is immediately manifest. With the latent injury, the only transaction is between

producers and consumers at time 1. If standards change, there is no way
later generations can be made to pay for their tastes. With the long-lived
machine, on the other hand, the rental or resale price in each period will
reflect the expected costs of injuries in the period. If liability costs change
due to rising standards of compensable damages, this can be reflected in
prices to later generations of consumers. But if the increase in liability
costs results from technological advance and a retroactively applied shift
in the due-care standard, then in competitive markets the older, less safe
machine will not be able to recoup its higher liability costs.5' This forced

obsolescence is no different from obsolescence due to any change in

technology or tastes, except that retroactively applied liability rules curtail a potentially longer economic life for those consumers willing to take

51 In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A2d 539 (1982), the
New Jersey supreme court ruled that a manufacturer can be held liable for its failure to warn
even if the hazard in question was unknowable at the time of the product's sale. See Gary T.

Schwartz, New Product, Old Product, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
796 (1983).
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the higher risk in return for a lower price. But this is simply a special case

of the general point that liability rules mandate uniform standards,
thereby tending to deprive consumers of the freedom to choose riskier
products or lower compensation. Thus one argument for a state-of-the-art
defense for long-lived products is that it permits consumers more options.

But if consumers are homogeneous in their preference for safety, courts
that apply current standards of care retroactively are merely enforcing
what informed markets would do otherwise.

Now consider the more realistic case, where liability rules-the scope

of liability, standard of care, rules of evidence, and size of damage
awards-not only change but are unpredictable. Uncertainty about legal

rules creates a risk additional to the unavoidable technological and
financial risks intrinsic to latent injuries. This has two important implica-

tions for liability insurance (see Appendix B). First, sociolegal risk
creates parameter uncertainty by destroying the insurer's ability to predict the loss distribution with any accuracy. Experience of the most recent policy years is not fully "mature," but the more mature experience
of older policy years rapidly becomes obsolete in a nonstationary environment.52 But even if statistical analysis could estimate past trends accurately, there is no guarantee the future will replicate the past.

Second, a long statute of repose induces positive correlation among
policyholders. The distribution of the expected loss per policyholder depends not only on the probability of an injury, but also (1) on the conditional probabilities, given an injury, that a claim is filed; (2) that an award
is made; and (3) on the size of the award. These last three factors depend
on the sociolegal climate common to all insureds. The longer the statute of
repose, the greater the weight of sociolegal risk relative to individual risk,
the greater the covariance among policyholders, and hence the greater the
variance in the mean outcome for the insurance portfolio. At the limit,
perfect correlation among outcomes for all policyholders is equivalent to
insuring one single policyholder. Long statutes of repose in a volatile legal
environment therefore reduce the financial gains from pooling, relative to
self-insurance.

52 The longer the statute of repose, the greater the backlog of claims that will be filed in
response to a pro-plaintiff legal change, and the greater the amplitude of transitory cycles in
frequency of claims filed per year. If the statute of repose is ten years, it requires ten years to
determine whether an increase in the number of claims filed in the first year represents

accelerated reporting of a given number of claims-in which case estimates of unreported
claims should be decreased-or an increase in underlying frequency-in which case estimates of unreported claims should be increased.
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B. Market Responses to Residual Risk
First, a digression is necessary to describe the types of liability insurance contract, which determine the allocation of risk between the insurer
and the policyholder. Traditionally, medical malpractice and product liability insurance have been written on an occurrence basis. The typical
medical malpractice occurrence policy written in policy year 1984 covers
claims arising out of practice in 1984, no matter how far in the future the

claims may be filed.53 A "claims made" policy covers claims filed in the
policy year, arising out of prior practice; claims filed in subsequent years
can be covered by a reporting endorsement, the availability but not the
price of which is guaranteed when the basic policy is purchased. Thus, to
have equivalent insurance with claims made, the policyholder must reserve or self-insure for the reporting endorsement at the time he purchases the initial policy. The typical product occurrence policy covers
injuries occurring in the policy year. Neither the time of manufacture of
the product nor the time at which the claim is made is relevant. As in the
case of claims made, since the insurer has more experience on which to
base the premium, the policyholder is exposed to more pricing risk under
this quasi-occurrence product policy than under the medical malpractice
occurrence policy.54
The medical malpractice occurrence coverage forces full prefunding,
whereas the product occurrence policy and the claims made permit "pay
as you go." To predict the appropriate premium for medical occurrence
coverage, the insurer must predict claim frequency and severity for the
duration of the discovery period or statute of repose, plus any lag in
disposition beyond that, up to fifteen years. For claims made, the insurer
must predict liability retrospectively for the discovery period. For the
occurrence product policy, in the absence of a statute of repose, retrospective prediction is indefinite and prospective prediction is for the statute of limitations, which does not begin to run until the discovery of the
injury.

Residual risk for a given line of insurance, due to small risk pool,
parameter uncertainty, or positive correlation among policyholders, is
not necessarily fatal to diversification through market insurance. Di3 Since a policy covers one year, policies written in 1984 cover incidents occurring

January 1984-December 1985. Thus a policy year spans two calendar years.

54 This applies particularly where all units of a product line are subject to similar risks.
Some recent court rulings have interpreted product liability policies, like medical malpractice occurrence policies, to run from the injury-causing act of the insured rather than from
the manifestation of the injury.
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versification may occur within a multiline firm, writing different lines of

insurance with negatively correlated experience, or through stock markets. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) implies that residual insurer
risk is nondiversifiable only if it is systematic, that is, underwriting losses

are highly correlated with losses for the market as a whole (high betas).
But if underwriting losses are uncorrelated with the market, insurance
premiums should reflect expected claim costs with little markup for risk.55

There is some evidence that, contrary to these predictions of CAPM,
the total variance of a firm's returns, including the nonsystematic component, is a significant determinant of the price of capital.56 In that case, or if

betas are high, the competitive insurance premium would include a markup above expected costs. If the markup must be sufficient to reduce to a
predetermined level the probability that claim costs exceed premiums,
then the markup is proportional to the residual standard deviation of the
mean, rc, which increases with the statute of limitations. The factor of
proportionality increases with the desired safety margin. For example, if
the desired probability of premium inadequacy should not exceed .01, the

markup is 2.33rc for large risk pools, more for smaller groups. Evidence
from medical malpractice rate hearings suggests that a standard deviation
at least equal to the mean would be a conservative estimate. That would
imply a "very safe" premium rate three times the expected claim costs,
plus overhead. I do not wish to imply that risk premiums of this magnitude are built into malpractice or product liability rates.57 I do contend

that, with a long duration of liability, a substantial markup for risk may be

warranted, even in competitive insurance markets.
If premiums include a markup for nondiversifiable risk, the expectation
is that ex post there will be net transfer from policyholders to equity

owners. This raises the price of market insurance relative to self-

5 The CAPM implies a competitive insurance premium, P = [E(c) - Xrmc]I/( + Rf),
where E(c) is expected costs, X is the market risk premium, rr,,c is the covariance between
the market return and claims, and Rf is the risk-free rate of return. Underwriting betas, by
line, cannot be estimated by standard methods, even for stock insurers, because the typical
firm's overall beta compounds returns on multiple lines of insurance, investment and noninsurance operations. Raymond D. Hill, Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance, 10

Bell J. Econ. 172 (1979); William B. Fairley, Investment Income and Profit Margins in
Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results, 10 Bell J. Econ. 192 (1979);
Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, Theory of Solvency Regulation in the Property and
Casualty Insurance Industry, in Studies in Public Regulation (Gary Fromm ed. 1981).
56 Haim Levy, The CAPM and Beta in an Imperfect Market, 6 J. Portfolio Management 5

(1980).

57 The formula used by the ISO to calculate advisory rates incorporates only a 5 percent
markup over losses plus expenses, for profit and other contingencies. But other components
of the formula-in particular, projected losses-are sufficiently judgmental to accommodate
an implicit allowance for risk.
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insurance and increases incentives for risk retention. There is consider-

able evidence to support this hypothesis. In medical malpractice, in response to the large premium increases in 1975, physician-owned mutuals
were formed and have expanded to cover over 40 percent of the market in
1982. A substantial fraction of hospital insurance is written through captive companies. The leading commercial carrier and several smaller carriers have replaced the traditional occurrence policy with a claims-made
policy, which transfers from the insurer to the insured the risk associated
with reserving for late claims.58
For product liability, measuring the market shares of self-insurance and
commercial insurance is impossible, because product liability is typically
written as part of a comprehensive general liability policy and, more
fundamentally, because the market itself-those potentially exposed to
product liability-is ill defined. But risk retention is obviously significant.
Trade association surveys, admittedly nonrandom samples, show up to 30
percent of firms without insurance, increased deductibles over time, and
lower limits of coverage relative to expected losses.59 Large firms often
purchase retrospectively rated policies and many have formed captive
insurers or self-insure, despite the tax advantages of commercial insurance.60 Smaller firms, for whom the risks and fixed capital costs of selfinsurance or captive insurance are relatively high, have obtained special
legislation to form risk pools.61
C. Implications of Long Statutes of Repose for the Tort System
The statute of repose defines the duration of liability shifting. The test
for an efficient statute involves weighing, at the margin, any efficiency
gains and losses in risk allocation, deterrence, and overhead costs. Obvi-

58 Since insurers presumably face lower costs of estimating and reserving for future

liability than do individual policyholders, one attraction of claims made apparently is its payas-you-go feature: there is no requirement to predict and prefund future liability. This is less
costly to policyholders in industries with significant barriers to entry and where insurance
premiums are not individually rated, which may explain why claims made has been adopted
in medical malpractice but not product liability.

5 U.S. Department of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final

Report (1978). Over 30 percent of firms in the machine tool industry either were not insured

or carried a deductible averaging $80,000. Problems Associated with Product Liability:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., June 26, September 27, and

October 16, 1979, at 35.

60 Self-insurance reserves are not tax deductible until paid out as claims. Premiums paid
to a captive insurer are tax deductible only if there is a transfer of risk, the operational
definition of which is currently under litigation. Business Insurance, August 1, 1983.
61 Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. ? 3901.
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ously there is no unique optimal statute for all contexts. My purpose here
is to point out how the gains from attempting full internalization through a

long statute fall as time elapses from the triggering event.

Consider first risk spreading, which has been one of the primary

justifications for extending the liability of producers.62 The argument
tends to ignore risk spreading through first-party insurance; it presupposes that the producer is fully insured and can pass on the cost of this
insurance in the product price, such that consumers pay for their own
insurance. In this ideal situation there is no burden on producers and no
transfer between generations of consumers. The evidence above suggests
that such costless, distribution-neutral insurance is not feasible for latent
injuries subject to sociolegal risk. If future injury costs are fully prefunded, either through an occurrence policy written at the time of the
triggering event, or through a quasi-occurrence or claims-made policy
where the producer prefunds the expected cost of a reporting endorsement, the early generation of consumers pays for the expected standards
of liability and damages adopted by later generations and for uncertainty
as to those standards. If this future liability is not prefunded, the intergenerational transfer is avoided. But to the extent current insurance costs to

cover prior liability cannot be passed on, these costs fall on producers or
injured victims. Thus the allocation of risk achieved by long statutes of
repose is not necessarily preferable to that achieved with a short statute,
given the availability of first-party private and public insurance.
With respect to deterrence, if the time path of liability rules entails an
anticipated expansion of compensable damages or retroactive application
of new knowledge, then the legal changes force a transfer from early to
later generations. Such a transfer cannot be judged inefficient but may be
considered undesirable, if wealth is rising over time. Where liability is not
only expanding but also uncertain, such that insurance premiums include
a markup for nondiversifiable risk, this markup is equivalent to a tax on
activities with potential latent injuries and long-lived capital goods, if
producers insure or self-insure. But if the response to high insurance costs
is to go bare, such that the expected cost of injuries is limited to assets
that can be attached in bankruptcy proceedings, the prevention incentives
that remain may be suboptimal. The incentive to go bare and risk or even
plan bankruptcy is greater the less the specific or brand-name capital at
62 For example, Justice Traynor's concurring decision in Esola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), "The cost of an injury . . . may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by

the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." See also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
(1963).
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stake.63 Consistent with this prediction, small firms, which arguably have
less brand-name capital than large firms, are more likely to go without
product liability insurance,64 and very few physicians go bare. In general,
if there is sufficient uncertainty about liability rules to generate significant

nondiversifiable insurance risk, the value of such liability as a guide to
prevention is questionable.65
In addition to the direct impact on prevention and risk allocation, the
uncertainty created by long statutes of repose has generated other indirect

costs. In malpractice, disagreement over the appropriate price of insurance has led to regulation of insurance premiums to levels deemed inadequate by commercial companies and to their total withdrawal from several states.66 By contrast, product liability, which so far is not subject to
rate regulation, experienced premium increases at least as great as those
proposed for medical malpractice but no comparable lack of availability.
The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability cited judgmental insurance rate making as a major cause of the product liability problem. Its

proposed solutions include more comprehensive data collection and
regulatory monitoring of rates to ensure that they are "fair, nondiscriminatory and reasonably related to product risk." The analysis here
suggests that even if the full universe of potential data is available, rate
making will optimally involve an element of judgment commensurate to
the relative importance of sociolegal risk.67 Where such risk is large,
uncertainty about fair rates cannot be resolved statistically. Regulation of
rates to the lower end of the feasible range is likely to induce carrier
withdrawal and lack of availability as occurred in medical malpractice.68
63 Munch & Smallwood, supra note 55.
64 The greater propensity of small firms to go bare may also reflect a relatively higher
price of insurance.
65 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability,
69 Cal. L. Rev. 919 (1981). The bankruptcy filings of three major corporations and implied
inadequacy of funds, through either insurance or self-insurance sources, to pay asbestos
claims is apparent evidence that in this context imposing liability does not deter, either
because the injuries were unforeseeable, the liability was unforeseeable, or the bankruptcy
option was cheaper. The net result is an excessively costly form of insurance.

6 Patricia Danzon, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis Revisited: Causes and

Solutions (Working Paper E-83-11, Hoover Inst., July 1983).

67 With pooled information and rate making in concert, errors in parameter forecasts will
be correlated and insurer insolvencies will tend to occur together. Emilio Venezian, Insurer
Capital Needs under Parameter Uncertainty, 50 J. Risk & Insurance 19 (1983).

68 To ensure availability, most states established a joint underwriting authority (JUA)
which requires commercial insurers to write medical malpractice as a condition of writing
other lines of insurance in the state. Typically, JUA losses may be recouped by a tax writeoff or a surcharge on premiums in other lines of insurance. While some subsidy may in

principle be justified to offset the risk tax implicit in insurance premiums, this is an

inefficient method of effecting such a subsidy.
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D. Conclusion

I have argued that unlimited producer liability for latent injuries and
long-lived products tends to create costs of inefficient risk allocation,
overdeterrence, and regulatory conflict that may outweigh any benefits
from attempting full cost internalization. If producer liability is to be
curtailed, one option is simply to apply a short statute of repose, running
from the occurrence of the injurious act (or date of first sale in the case of

capital goods) rather than from the manifestation of injury. The statute
should be shorter the more volatile are sociolegal rules. Injuries discovered after the running of the statute would be borne by the victim's first-

party insurance or public programs. Since these are pay-as-you-go
programs covering all injuries regardless of cause, the issue of

nondiversifiable risk does not arise. The presumption of some judicial
rulings that manufacturers are better able than consumers to spread risk is
at best of doubtful validity, but almost certainly false when sociolegal risk

is at issue. Let us allow that risk misperception and adverse selection lead
to suboptimal private insurance for those not eligible for employmentbased group programs. That this problem applies to all injuries, not just to
the small fraction potentially eligible for tort compensation, argues for a
general public program such as SSDI rather than for extending the compulsory insurance through tort to cover at most a small fraction of catastrophic injuries. It is ironic and unfortunate that current rules of eligibil-

ity for SSDI are based on recent employment and exclude precisely those
for whom private insurance markets function relatively poorly.
An alternative solution to the latent injury problem is to shift liability to

the government. In some states, compensation funds already pay
malpractice awards beyond a statutory threshold-typically $100,000 per
defendant. Proposals for special government funds for occupational disease are proliferating; but, again, they perversely single out the employed
who, among all victims of toxic exposure, are most likely to have alternative private or workers' compensation coverage. The main advantage of
government intervention is to prevent the forced prefunding of future
liability, the resulting transfer from early to later generations, and the risk

tax on the early generation (ignoring planned bankruptcy). But this purpose is served by simply curtailing liability through a statute of repose.
The disadvantages of government funds are obvious. With respect to
deterrence, government funds tend to protect producers from efficient as

well as inefficient impositions of liability. With respect to compensation,
theory and evidence from other government programs suggest that when
benefit levels and eligibility criteria are set through the political process
for a specific, identifiable group of beneficiaries, the moral hazard-or
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tendency to award excessive levels of insurance-may be greater than
through the tort system.

A full analysis of the occupational disease problem is beyond the scope
of this paper. The analysis here provides an additional reason to extinguish tort remedies against product suppliers or employers. To encompass
diseases, such as cancer, that have at least a twenty-year latency period
would require a statute of repose at least that long. The risk costs of such
a statute probably outweigh any benefits, given the volatility of tort stan-

dards. This logic applies to a lesser degree to workers' compensation
liability, because compensation benefits and eligibility criteria are set by
statute and can therefore be more readily constrained. Of course the
problems of prolonged liability are avoided if liability is imposed on the
employer at the time the injury is manifest. But this eliminates all deterrence and exposes victims to risk. Because prior liability costs cannot be
passed on in current product prices, the person with prior toxic exposure

may face difficulties in obtaining new employment, unless costs are

shifted to second injury funds. A superior solution for deterrence and risk

allocation may be to prorate liability over all employers contributing to
the exposure; to limit benefits to levels prevailing at the time of exposure,
adjusted upward by the rate of return on reserves between exposure and
manifestation; and to rely on second injury funds or first-party insurance
and SSDI in the event none of the responsible employers are available.
APPENDIX A

OPTIMAL DAMAGE AWARDS

The model applies in any market context where consumers may be injured by
product failure that depends only on the care taken by producers. Assume that
expenditure on prevention affects the probability but not the size of loss and that
each consumer buys just one unit of the product.69 Insurance for first-party or
liability losses is available, with perfect experience rating and a proportionate
loading charge. The following notation is used:
V(B) = consumer's utility of initial wealth, V' > 0, V" < 0;
p(r) = probability of injury, p' < 0, p" > 0;
r = quality (prevention) per unit;
s = product price;
c(r) = production cost per unit, c' > 0, c" < 0;
L = monetary loss to consumer if injury occurs;
M = first-party insurance coverage bought by consumer;

69 This abstracts from the effects of liability rules on the level of activity. See Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
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yp = premium
rate per dollar of first party coverage, where y - 1 is the
loading charge;

h(p) = consumer's perception of p, h' > 0, h" < 0;
U(A) = producer's utility of initial wealth, U' > 0, U" < 0;

D = damages paid by producer if found liable;
Q = liability insurance coverage bought by producer;
Xp = premium rate per dollar of liability coverage, where X - 1 is the
loading charge;
1i = Lagrange multiplier.

Subscript 0 denotes the state in which an injury occurs. Subscript 1 denotes the
state in which no injury occurs. Subscriptsf, s, and n denote first-party, strict, and

negligence liability, respectively. Initially, consumers are assumed to be fully

informed.

FIRST-PARTY LIABILITY

If consumers are fully informed, competitive markets induce producers to
choose the level of safety (r) and product price (s) to maximize expected utility of
consumers, E(V), subject to maintaining an opportunity level of utility, UC, determined by the producer's alternative use of time.7" Consumers select first-party

insurance coverage (M), given the price per dollar of coverage, p. Informed

markets thus solve the following optimization problem:

max b = (1 -p)VI[B - s - ypM] + p Vo[B - s - ypM - L + M]
M,s,r

+ iI {U[A + s - c(r)] - Uc}.

(Al)

Maximization with respect to M, s, and r yields

y

V'

=

V0,

(A2)

V' = I U', (A3)

c' -p' -V' + y M, (A4)
where V' = (1 - p) V1 + p V0.
Rewriting equation (2),

V'1 _ 1 - p < 1 as y- 1, (A2')
shows that optimal coverage does not fully equate the marginal utility of income if

the insurance premium contains a proportionate load (y > 1). Equation (A4)

shows that if injury reduces the utility of income (V1 > V0), optimal prevention
(rf) may exceed the optimal level with risk neutrality (c' = - p'L), even with full
insurance coverage of any monetary loss.

70 If the producer has monopoly power, Uc includes some rent, but the structure of the
problem is not affected.
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STRICT THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY

Under a rule of strict third-party liability, an omniscient benevolent dictator

would choose the damage award (D), defendant's liability insurance coverage
(Q), prevention (r), and product price (s) to maximize the consumer's expected

utility, subject to maintaining the producer's opportunity level of utility, Uc:

max ( = (1 -p)V1[B - s] + pVo[B - s - L + D]
D,Q,s,r

+ 4 {(1 - p)U1 [A + S - c(r) - XpQ] (A5)
+ pUo[A + s - c(r) - XpQ - (D - Q)] - Uc}.

Maximization with respect to D, Q, s, and r yields:

V6 = U , (A6)

XU' = U (A7)
V' = U' (A8)

c , P( V, - V' + U,- Uo + XQ), (A9)
where U' = (1 - p) U{ + pU6.
Equations (A6), (A7), and (A8) together imply:

V - U; _ l-Xp 1 as 1.
vo u6 x--Xp

The optimal damage award, D*, provides the level of insurance consumers
would choose to buy given the load of the producer's liability insurance. Thus
D* M, as X y.
NEGLIGENCE

Under a negligence rule, the producer is liable only if he fails to meet the duecare standard, r *. The social welfare function is given by equation (Al) for r < r*
and by equation (A5) for r > r* . If U is state dependent, the producer cannot fully
insure against the loss. The social welfare function is discontinuous, with a vertical jump at r* because of the loss imposed on producers.71 If D is set at D *, the
optimal level of insurance given the liability load, and r* = r , the producer's
decision problem is to choose Q, s, and r to maximize E(V), subject to E(U) > UC
and subject to the penalty D = D* if r < r*. But this private objective function is
identical to the social welfare function; that is, it is a discontinuous function equal
to equation (A 1) for r > r and equal to equation (A5) for r < r*. If either X > y- or

7' Note that this discontinuity occurs in the social (and private) welfare function for
reasons related but not identical to those noted in Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982). Here markets force producers to internalize
injuries to victims, so these costs are not avoided by being nonnegligent. However, the
defendant's personal costs of suit are avoided.
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Uo < U1, this negligence rule will lead producers to choose r = r*, that is, to be

nonnegligent.72

Imperfect Information. If consumers underestimate risks, under first-party
liability they buy too little insurance and nonoptimal safety. Spence shows that
under strict liability, a first-best solution with respect to compensation and prevention can be achieved by means of a two-part penalty." A compensatory award
equal to D* is paid to victims. A fine, paid to the state initially but refunded as a
subsidy to the hazardous product, is set equal to (1 - h') (V1 - Vo)/V', where
h(p) is the consumer's perception of p and (V1 - Vo)/V' is the dollar measure of
utility loss implied by the consumer's willingness to pay for injury reduction.
Under a negligence rule with a risk-averse defendant and incomplete insurance,
provided the standard of care is correctly set at rf, the fine necessary to achieve
compliance is less than under strict liability because of the discontinuity of the
pay-off function. The physician will choose to meet the standard, provided

UI U'
- VI -V'
Vo h'
M.
pI)
Thus if the load on liability insurance is at least as great as the load on first-party

insurance (h > y), a fine over and above the compensatory award paid to victims
is not necessary to induce compliance with a negligence standard, if the uncompensated cost of suit to defendants (Ul - Uo)/U' exceeds the distortion in market
incentives due to consumer misperceptions [(V1 - V0)/V'][1 - (h'/p')]. Since the
fine-subsidy mechanism is presumably costly to administer, this likelihood that
incentives are adequate without a fine is an added attraction of a negligence rule
over strict liability.

APPENDIX B

EFFECTS OF LONG STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ON INSURANCE RISK
STANDARD MODEL OF "RISK-FREE" INSURANCE

For each of n policyholders, the expected claims cost, E(Ci), is an independent
drawing from a loss distribution with known mean 1i and standard deviation r. By

the central limit theorem (CLT), regardless of the shape of the underlying loss

distribution, the cost of the total insurance portfolio is normally distributed with

mean n i and variance no"2. The relative risk of the insurance portfolio, defined as

72 If X > - > 1, it might be optimal to provide compensation through first-party coverage
and impose a liability fine on physicians to achieve optimal deterrence. Enforcement would
depend on subrogation actions by the patient's first-party insurer against the tortfeasor or his
liability insurer.

73 Spence, supra note 4.
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the coefficient of variation, is or/Vi.74 As n approaches infinity, the limiting
distribution of the random variable Z, defined as

Z = Vicr
>Ci- napproaches a standard normal distribution. Since
n

pr(ZCiEn1 + ZrVno = r) , (B 1)
where Zr is a standard normal ordinate for confidence level r, if the firm estab-

lishes a capital reserve of Zr, /na, the probability of insolvency is 1 - r. For
example, if the desired probability of insolvency is .01, Zr = 2.33.
Assume that all capital must be raised from policyholders, as in a mutual. A
premium rate, R, set equal to the expected claims cost per policyholder, [L, plus a
markup of 2.33 a/Vn, will cover losses with .99 probability. As n tends to infinity,
the standard deviation of the mean loss per policyholder, r/V/, and hence the
capital contribution necessary to assure the desired probability of solvency, tends

to zero.75

UNKNOWN PARAMETERS: STATIONARY DISTRIBUTION

When the parameters of the underlying loss distribution are not known with
certainty, using estimates Me and Se in place of I. and a in equation (B 1) will result
in a less than .99 probability of solvency.76 If the underlying loss distribution is

stationary, the parameters can be estimated from past experience, but the
confidence interval formula must include an adjustment for sampling variation in
the parameter estimates. Assuming independence from year to year and an equal
number of policyholders in the estimation period (ne) and the future policy year
(nf), the required rate is

R = Me + ZroSne
( 1 +nf
1 = Me + ZrV2hcI.
Since 2- = 1.41, adjustment for sampling error in the mean increases the safety
mark-up by 41 percent, but the total still tends to zero as n tends to infinity.77
74 J. David Cummins, Insurer's Risk: A Restatement, 41 J. Risk & Insurance 147 (1974).
75 If n is insufficient to justify using the limiting normal distribution, then Chebyshev's
inequality can be used. This states that if X,, is the mean of a random sample of size n from a

distribution with mean pL and variance a2, then pr[XY,, - >l k//n]7 < 1/k2 = r, where k =
r/n-a. Thus if r = .01, the required capital contribution is ten standard deviations, instead
of 2.33 under normality. For use of the normal power approximation, see Venezian, supra

note 67.

76 Gary M. Andrews, A Note on the Use of Statistics in Rate Determination, 35 J. Risk &
Insurance 320 (1968).

77 Adjustment for unknown a when losses are normally distributed is discussed in Cum-
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NONSTATIONARY DISTRIBUTION

1. Sociolegal Risk
For the ith policyholder, claims cost for a given policy year J is the sum of
claims filed in each development year t until the statute of limitations has run, T:
Cij = cT=j ci,. (Discounting and delay in settlement are ignored and policy year
subscripts are dropped hereafter except where necessary.) Assume that cit is
drawn from a distribution with mean ,t and variance cr0t. The total variance, cr,,
has two components: a policy year component, ur, reflecting policyholder characteristics, and a development year component, tr,,, reflecting legal factors. Thus
expected loss for the ith policyholder is
T

E(Ci)= E[ t=j(it+ wit) + uil

Y, ? it-

t=j

Expected loss on the insurance portfolio of n policies is E (17 Ci) = nQ i with

variance:

N

T

var C) = nc + >[nut, + n(n - 1)pwi, (B2)
j=1t=j

where pwowt is the covariation among policyholders in the tth development year.
The standard deviation of loss per policyholder is

re = S(C) = Iyrln + >[Ot=jtwtIn + Pwr2wt - pwtln], (B3)
with limiting value for large n and common cwt, for all t:78

lim O'e, = r wt = V
t=j

Thus the sociolegal risk due to development year shocks which affect all policyholders is a multiplicative function of the magnitude of the shock (cw), the number

of development years (T), and the correlation among policyholders (pw). It is
independent of the size of the risk pool, n.

mins, supra note 74. For personal injury lines where the normality assumption is clearly
inappropriate, more complex methods are needed.
78 Sociolegal risk is more or less than proportional to the statute of limitations, as aw, Z
rwt-1, that is, development-year shocks increase or decrease with years after the policy
year. Although number of claims filed is likely to decrease with time, size of loss is likely to

increase, both because of inflation of awards and because the added cost due to decay of
evidence over time eliminates relatively more minor claims.
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2. Parameter Uncertainty

To predict the mean pj for policy year j, a common procedure is (1) to "de-

velop" the immature experience of recent policy years, extrapolating from report-

ing patterns on prior years; (2) to fit a trend, g, through K developed previous
policy years; and (3) to apply this trend to the most recent policy year (or a
weighted average of the two or three most recent). Thus, j = Cj_ i. The actual
value is Cj = gpj-_ + vj + ej, where v is a stochastic component in the trend, with

E(v) = 0, E(v2) = Or and E (vj, vj-) = 0; and ej = uj + wj has mean zero and
standard deviation re given by equation (B3).
The prediction base, Cj_ I, is measured with error, Cj_ - p-j 1 = ej + sj, where
ej = uj + wi, and sj is development error due to estimating ultimate experience on

the basis of reporting patterns against earlier years. Assume that this development
error has zero mean and is not correlated serially or with other error components:

E(s) = 0, E(sj, s_ ) = 0, E(s, v) = 0. The discrepancy between predicted and
actual value is d = j - Cj = (9 - g)Cj_ I + g(Cj_- - Lj-1) - v - e, with E(d) =

0, and

var (d) = o2 [1 + Cjl' (X'X)-'Cj1] + (g + 1) r2e + gcr
-V + "2 + g (.24 + "2)+ e2
The prediction variance thus has four components. ov is due to unexplained
residual variance in the model predicting the trend. or2 is due to error in estimating

the trend, g. The third term, g(re + ors) reflects measurement error in the base
used for extrapolation, Cj_ 1. And e2 is the policy year residual.
Thus assuming normality, the premium rate required for a (1 - r) probability of

insolvency is R = +. + Zr Vc + + gcr2 + (g + 1) re, which has limiting
value, as n -* oo, R = r. + Zr~V/ + + gor + (g + 1) Tpwrw. Long statutes

of limitations contribute to nondiversifiable insurer risk through projection error

(or and or2) and by increasing the weight attached to sociolegal changes correlated

across insureds (/wYaw).
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